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The idea that we have epistemic responsibilities with respect to our beliefs has been well explored in the philosophical literature.  In this paper, I examine a more specific but less explored version of this thesis: Namely, that we have epistemic responsibilities with respect to beliefs that are the result of our visual searches. I argue that we have responsibilities to control these beliefs by way of controlling the visual searches that precede them.  The responsibilities we have during a visual search may seem a little too obvious and coarse-grained to warrant serious investigation; they may seem limited to such unexciting and broad claims as “keep your eyes open”, “face your head in the right direction”, “take more than just a glance when you look”, “look hard”, etc.   In this paper, I attack this assumption.  I will show that we have fine-grained forms of control over our visual searches and that these forms of control, in turn, can generate interesting and fine-grained responsibilities with respect to our visual searches and the beliefs they produce.
The claim that we can exert interesting and fine-grained control over our searches, if true, would have major repercussions for our lives as epistemic agents.  It’s easy to underestimate just how widespread the activity of visual search is within our everyday visual encounters of the world—seeing and identifying an object is rarely as straightforward as opening your eyes and directing your gaze towards it.  Given severe limitations on visual processing (which I’ll examine in section 4), much of day-to-day vision consists of adopting (either consciously or unconsciously) various shortcuts and strategies to effectively allocate the limited resources of the visual system to the relevant regions and features before one’s eyes; in short, much of vision consists of various kinds of visual search.  
Here are just a few examples: The ability to see reversible and ambiguous figures depends on our ability to find the right aspects of these figures to attend to (Peterson and Gibson 1991); the ability to “fuse” a stereoscopic picture (or to use stereo fusion more generally) depends on finding the right features of the scene to attend to and drive the mechanism of eye vergence (Pylyshyn 2003, 83); the expert X-ray reader, artist, and map-reader are all separated from the novice, in part, by their ability to carry out effective and efficient visual searches (Solso 1994, 129-156); and the superior reaction time of athletes appears to be the result of their ability to anticipate which, in turn, is based on their knowing what features to attend to in the surrounding environment (Pylyshyn 2003, 85).  If I’m correct in claiming that we can exert relatively fine-grained forms of control over our searches, then it’s possible that we could actively control the above searches in a way that would help aim the resultant beliefs—beliefs about the three-dimensional shape of an ambiguous figure, stereoscopic-based beliefs about depth, beliefs about the indicators of cancer on an X-ray, beliefs about the symmetry of a painting, etc.—towards the epistemic goal of truth.
	The ability to effectively and efficiently direct the limited resources of the visual system to various features/regions of the space before the eyes is a constant element of successful vision.  Zenon Pylyshyn has gone so far as to claim that “spatial and object-based focusing of attention is perhaps the most important mechanism by which the visual system rapidly adjusts to an informationally dense and dynamic world.  It thus represents the main interface between cognition and vision…” (2003, 88).  In short, visual search is not something that we engage in only when looking for misplaced keys; rather, it is something that permeates many of our visual encounters of the world.  And this means, in turn, that the epistemic responsibilities we can have in virtue of being able to exert fine-grained control over our searches could also end up permeating many of our visual encounters of the world.  
In what follows, I present my argument for thinking that we can have fine-grained control of (and fine-grained responsibilities with respect to) our visual searches. I begin (in section 2) with a review of the general kinds of control that we could have over our beliefs.  This review will allow me to identify the specific kind of control we have over some of our beliefs in virtue of being able to control the search that precedes them.  In section 3, I present an intuitive argument for thinking that we can exert fine-grained forms of control over our visual searches (and, hence, have responsibilities with respect to the beliefs these searches produce).  In section 4, I provide a further defense of this claim: To start with, I examine various ways in which the visual system is limited in its ability to extract high-detail information from the environment.  As a result of these limitations, visual searches end up being far more complex processes than we may have realized. I then identify some of the ways that we can exert interesting and fine-grained forms of control over these processes.  And in the conclusion, I show how the forms of control discussed in section 4 can be used to aim our visual beliefs towards various epistemic goals.  

2. Control, Responsibility, and Belief
In order to have responsibilities with respect to our beliefs, we must be capable of exerting some control over them.​[1]​  So in order to make the case that we have responsibilities with respect to beliefs that arise from a visual search, I need to say something about the kind of control we have over these beliefs.   Let’s start by distinguishing between two general (but not mutually exclusive) forms of control that we could have over our beliefs: “Direct control” and “indirect control”.​[2]​  Direct control is the kind of control over belief that would allow you, via an intention, to form a specific, predetermined belief.  It is a form of control over belief such that, if I had it, I could use it to make myself believe that Al Gore is president.​[3]​
Indirect control over belief, in contrast, is not control to bring about a specific, predetermined belief; rather, it is a form of control that allows you to bring it about that you have some belief or other from within a certain range of possible beliefs.​[4]​  To get a sense of how indirect control over a belief can make you responsible for that belief, consider the following example from Alston (2005, 74): On the basis of idle gossip, you believe (falsely) that Jim is trying to undermine Susie’s position as chair.  Even if you cannot directly control what you believe in this situation, you still can be responsible for your false belief.  Why?  Because there is something you could have done—you could have looked into the matter further and not rested content with idle gossip—such that, if you had done it, you would not have ended up having this false belief.  Notice that if you had done this extra thing, you would not have been attempting to make yourself come to have a specific, predetermined belief about Jim and Susie; rather, you would have been attempting to change the process that leads to your belief in an attempt to better aim the result—whatever it may be—towards the truth. 
It is controversial whether we have direct control over our beliefs​[5]​; that we have some indirect control over our beliefs, however, seems to be taken for granted by everyone.  Let’s take a closer look at the idea of indirect control over belief.  Alston claims that there are two general ways in which we can indirectly control our beliefs: 1) via voluntary activities that involve “looking for considerations relevant to the belief in question, or not doing so” (2005, 77), and 2) via voluntary activities “that affect our general belief-forming habits or tendencies” (2005, 77).  The voluntary activities of (2) involve inculcating various habits and, hence, end up being long-term projects.  The activities of (1), in contrast, involve making and immediately executing decisions such as “…whether I look for relevant evidence and reasons, reflect on a particular argument, seek input from other people, search my memory for analogous cases, and so one” (2005, 75).  Let’s call these latter activities “evidence-gathering activities”.  Evidence-gathering activities are activities over which we can exert a direct (and relatively immediate) form of control and which, in turn, allow us to exert an indirect (but still relatively immediate) form of control over some of our beliefs.
The form of indirect control over belief that I’m going to explore involves a specific class of evidence-gathering activities; it involves indirectly controlling some of our visual beliefs by controlling the visual search that precedes them.  In virtue of having this kind of indirect control over our visual beliefs, we can have certain “short-term” responsibilities with respect to those beliefs.​[6]​  In this paper, I’ll focus on three short-term responsibilities we can have with respect to our visual searches and the beliefs they produce: The responsibility to avoid error (i.e. false belief), the responsibility to avoid ignorance (i.e. the absence of true belief), and the responsibility to form our beliefs quickly.​[7]​  I’ll refer to all three of these responsibilities as being “broadly epistemic responsibilities”.​[8]​ 
At this point, I want to pause to consider the question of what makes these responsibilities binding.  Just because there are things we could do that would improve the odds of our searches being successful and efficient, it does not follow that we are actually obliged to do them.  I suppose one could try to argue that we inherit such responsibilities categorically simply in virtue of being epistemic agents.  For expositional purposes, however, I will run with a much weaker position: What makes the rules of conduct for a visual search binding are the agent’s desires to search in a way to avoid error and ignorance and to form beliefs quickly.  I assume that most times when someone conducts a visual search they have some or all of these desires.  (Of course, in any given search one or more of these desires can take precedence over the others.)  Given this assumption, it follows that the broadly epistemic responsibilities listed above will be binding for most searches.
It is important to distinguish between the “subjective” and “objective” responsibilities that a subject has with respect to her beliefs in virtue of having the ability to indirectly control them.​[9]​ “Subjective” responsibilities are responsibilities to try to do one’s best to form beliefs in accordance with various broadly epistemic goals given what one believes about how to best accomplish these goals.  “Objective” responsibilities, in contrast, are responsibilities to form one’s beliefs in a manner that, in fact, is in accordance with various broadly epistemic goals.  You will be ignorant of your objective responsibilities if you do not know the best way to reach whatever broadly epistemic goal you are pursuing.  For this reason, it is possible to fail in your objective responsibilities with respect to a belief and still be blameless with respect to that belief.  This would be the case if there were something you could have done to make one of your beliefs better off (in a broadly epistemic way) but you were not aware of what it was (and your ignorance was not culpable).  
This last point is why the distinction between subjective and objective responsibilities is important for this paper.  I will be arguing that there are fine-grained forms of control over visual search that are available to us, but that we might not be fully cognizant of these forms of control or, even if we are cognizant of them, we might lack the information necessary to know how to properly use them to aim the ensuing beliefs towards the goals of fighting error and ignorance and the goal of speed.  In short, our current failure to take advantage of these forms of control to aim our visual searches (and the resultant beliefs) towards the broadly epistemic goals that we desire may only constitute a failure of our objective, not subjective, responsibilities. 
In the upcoming sections, I explore and defend the idea that there are things that we can do during our visual searches (whether we are aware of these things or not) such that, if we did them, they would allow us to better aim some of the resultant visual beliefs towards the goals of avoiding error, fighting ignorance, and/or forming beliefs quickly. Before undertaking this project, however, I want to note that the basic idea here is not without precedent. Alvin Goldman, for example, claims that part of the job of the epistemologist is to identify the ways in which we can indirectly influence belief and that “attention constitutes the most important cognitive process largely under voluntary control.  By directing perceptual attention we can influence our evidence and, thereby, our doxastic attitudes” (1978, 516, his emphasis). A large part of what I am doing in this paper can be viewed as an attempt to fill out and further defend this provocative idea.

3. An Intuitive Argument for Fine-Grained Responsibilities During a Visual Search
In this section and the next, I make my case for thinking that we have interesting and fine-grained (objective) responsibilities when conducting a visual search.  I begin with an intuitive argument in favor of this claim, an argument that focuses on a case of a failed search and the responsibility to avoid false belief.  

The case of Jimmy: Jimmy is asked by his mother to check the floor of his messy room for a pair of socks.  He enters his room, looks around, comes back and reports that the socks are not there.  His mother then enters the room and finds the sock in plain sight.  Frustrated, she asks, “Jimmy, did you even try to look for your socks?”  Jimmy honestly answers “yes.”  She then says, “Well, you should have looked harder.”  

Let’s assume that during his search, Jimmy kept his eyes opened, kept them directed at the floor of his room, and took more than just a cursory glance at that floor.  Let’s also assume that Jimmy had the desire to carry out his search in a way that would aim the resultant beliefs towards the goal of avoiding error.  Finally, let’s assume Jimmy’s mother knows these facts about Jimmy’s search.  In chastising him, her complaint is not that he failed to keep his eyes open, or that he failed to direct his gaze at the floor, or that he failed to take much more than a glance at that floor.  Rather, her complaint is that he failed in some other, more fine-grained, way; he could have done something else in conducting his search and doing so would have made a difference in terms of arriving at the correct doxastic attitude concerning the presence of his socks.  (To be fair to Jimmy, it is a further question whether he is genuinely blameworthy for his failure to find the socks.  It is possible that Jimmy failed in his objective responsibilities but not in his subjective responsibilities.) 
My intuitions are in line with those of Jimmy’s mother: I believe that Jimmy could have done something differently in his search and that doing so would have rectified his false belief.  (Unlike his mother, however, I’m not so confident that Jimmy is blameworthy for his failure.)  But are these intuitions correct?  Could Jimmy really have done something differently in his search that would have rectified his false belief about his socks?  And if so, what should he have done differently? Should he have searched longer?  Perhaps, although searching for a longer period of time is not always the best remedy for this kind of failure.  The problem might not be with how long he searched, but with how he searched more generally.  But what exactly was the problem with how he searched?  Stating that he didn’t look hard enough is hardly a satisfying diagnosis. 
To answer these questions—to determine if Jimmy could have done something differently to remedy his problems and, if so, to determine what it is—we need to defer to the cognitive sciences.  Although the case for interesting responsibilities during a visual search can be motivated (in part) from the armchair, a full defense and refinement of this idea must be given from the lab. Using the cognitive sciences in this way is a project that falls under the rubric of what Goldman has referred to as “Epistemics” (1978) and “Scientific Epistemology” (1995). 

On my view, epistemic concepts like knowledge and justification crucially invoke psychological faculties or processes.  Our folk understanding, however, has a limited and tenuous grasp of the processes available to the cognitive agent.  Thus, one important respect in which epistemic folkways should be transcended is by incorporating a more detailed and empirically based depiction of psychological mechanisms. (1995, 96)

To get a basic sense of what Epistemics/Scientific Epistemology might look like in this context, let’s consider a related case: Chicken sexing. “Chicken sexers” have the job of visually identifying the sex of day-old chicks. Chicken sexers are trained by looking at photos of chicks whose sex is already known.  Over time, they learn to pick up on subtle cues in the photos that are indicative of the chick’s sex.  Interestingly, chicken sexers can learn this skill (and often do) while not being fully cognizant of what the relevant cues are.  So an expert chicken sexer might find himself in a position where he believes that a novice chicken sexer isn’t searching right when he looks at a chick, but is unable to provide any detailed advice about how to remedy the problems with the novice’s search.  (Notice that this is similar, in spirit, to the position that Jimmy’s mother finds herself in.)
	Is there an easy way to remedy the problems of the novice chicken sexer? What is the expert chicken sexer doing in his search that the novice is failing to do? A study by Biederman and Shiffrar (1987) has attempted to answer these questions.  To quote Zenon Pylyshyn’s discussion of this study:

By carefully studying the experts, Biederman and Shiffrar found that what distinguished good sexers from poor ones is, roughly, where they look and what distinctive features they look for.  Although the experts were not aware of it, what they had learned was the set of contrasting features and, even more important, where exactly the distinguishing information was located.  Biederman and Shiffrar found that telling novices where the relevant information was located allowed them quickly to become experts themselves.  (2003, 86, my emphasis)

This empirical study shows that there is a form of control that can be exerted over our visual searches of day-old chicks and that exerting this control in the right way can help improve the reliability of the resultant beliefs about their sex.  In short, this study yields far more specific and helpful advice to the novice chicken sexer than “try to look harder at the chicks.” 
	There is a growing body of empirical literature on what we might call “specialized” visual searches: For example, searches for the identifying marks of a chick, searches for signs of cancer on an X-ray, etc.  My interest, however, concerns the kind of search conducted by Jimmy—general, everyday searches where we are trying to locate regular objects in a potentially cluttered environment.  The latter kind of search has not received the same amount of explicit investigation within the cognitive sciences as the former.  (Part of the problem is that the nuances of everyday searches are difficult to reproduce and model in the lab.)  But it is natural to think that the cognitive sciences could be of help here: If the cognitive sciences can help the novice chicken sexer do a better job of conducting his search, it’s natural to think that they could also help you and me do a better job of finding our car keys on a messy table.  
In the next section, I will argue that the cognitive sciences can indeed help us in this regard. My defense of this idea will focus on limitations of the visual system’s capacity to instantaneously generate high-detail representations of the surrounding environment.  As a result of these limitations, our visual searches are far more complex processes than many people realize.  Using various results and ideas from the cognitive sciences, I will argue that we can exert interesting and fine-grained control over various aspects of these complex processes and that in virtue of exerting this control we can significantly impact the broadly epistemic qualities of the resultant beliefs.  To be clear, I will not be offering much concrete advice on how to improve our everyday visual searches—that’s a job I leave for those in the cognitive sciences. My job, as a philosopher, is: 1) to make the case that in general we have enough interesting and fine-grained control over our visual searches to significantly impact the epistemic qualities of the resultant visual beliefs and 2) to speculate a bit about what kind of epistemic advice concerning our everyday searches the cognitive sciences might ultimately give us. 

4. Managing the Limitations of the Visual System During a Search
There is an unfortunate tendency among both philosophers and psychologists to think of vision as instantaneously providing a high-detail representation of the entire scene facing the subject. Alva Noë has described this tendency in the following way—

According to a conception of visual experience that has been widely held by perceptual theorists, you open your eyes and—presto!—you enjoy a richly detailed picture-like experience of the world, one that represents the world in sharp focus, uniform detail and high resolution from the centre out to the periphery. (2002, 2, his emphasis) 

If the snapshot conception of visual experience were correct, there might not be much room for interesting and fine-grained control over a visual search and, subsequently, not much room for interesting evidence-gathering responsibilities during that search.​[10]​  If the snapshot conception were correct, your evidence-gathering responsibilities during visual search really might be limited to just keeping your eyes open and to pointing your face in the general direction where you believe the sought-after object to reside.
The truth, however, is that the visual system is extremely limited in terms of the high quality representation it can form at a given moment.  Far from being a passive camera-like receiver of information from the environment, the visual system is quite active in its efforts to overcome its representational limitations.  And this activity, in turn, is what makes it possible to have (objective) responsibilities during our visual searches, responsibilities that are far more detailed and interesting than “open your eyes and look hard”.
Let’s take a closer look at some of the limitations of the visual system. To start with, there is a physiological constraint involving the eye.  The human retina contains two basic kinds of photoreceptors: Rods, which function in low illumination, and cones, which function in high illumination and subserve the perception of color.  The cones are not evenly distributed across the retina—the highest concentration of cones occurs in a small area at the center of the retina known as the fovea.  This small region yields by far the highest spatial resolution of the retina, about an order of magnitude greater than outside the fovea.  To compensate for this disparity in resolving power, the fovea is aimed at various objects within the environment using a sequence of swift movements or “saccades” (each lasting between 5 to 80msec) and respites or “fixations” (each lasting around 250msec) (Grimes 1996). 
During fixation, visual representations of objects (or “stimuli”) can result from stimulation of either the foveal or extra-foveal regions of the retina.  Let’s call visual representations that are the result of foveal stimulation “foveal representations” and call those that are the result of extra-foveal stimulation “peripheral representations”.  Due to the small size of the fovea, only an area with a diameter of about 2 degrees (approximately the size of a thumbnail at arm’s length) is foveally represented during fixation.  Consequently, the bulk of the environment that is represented during fixation is represented by way of lower-detail peripheral representations.
Crosscutting the distinction between foveal and peripheral representations of stimuli is the distinction between attended stimuli and stimuli that are registered and capable of being attended, but which are not actually attended.  Attention, as William James put it, “is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought” (1890/1950, 403-4). Visual attention, in turn, is the activity of focusing on a visually represented stimulus (or stimuli) at the cost of not focusing on (or ignoring) other visually represented stimuli. It is important to note that visual attention is an internal, not an external, form of visual selectivity.  Facing one’s eyes in a particular direction, for instance, is not an operation of visual attention.  (Indeed, there are “covert” shifts of attention—shifts of attention that do not correspond with shifts of fixation.)
It is widely accepted by visual psychologists that visual attention is the second stage of a two-stage visual process: In the first stage, the low-level visual features of a scene (color, orientation, etc.) are registered by massively parallel visual processing.  The later stage, in turn, involves the selective deployment of a limited (possibly serial) capacity to process the higher-level visual features of that scene (faces, objects, etc).  The stimuli processed by this later stage—stimuli that are attended—are reacted to more quickly, register at a lower threshold, register more accurately, and are more likely to be remembered than the stimuli that are only processed by the first stage.  
To be clear, there’s plenty of disagreement about the details of this rough sketch of visual processing.  There are, for example, disagreements about whether visual attention is allocated to locations or objects (or both), disagreements about which visual features are registered by pre-attentive processing, disagreements about just how “high-level” pre-attentively registered features can be, and so on.​[11]​ Despite these disagreements, however, most visual psychologists agree with the rough outline of the difference between pre-attentive and attentive visual processing provided above.
Now that we have examined some of the differences between pre-attentive and attentive processing, let’s briefly examine the so-called “spotlight” of attention.  As we have seen, visual attention is selective capacity—it is said to be like a spotlight that illuminates only a portion of the visual field at any particular moment.  Closer empirical examination, however, has revealed that the spotlight of attention is adjustable.  As visual attention expands to encompass a larger area of the surrounding space there are fewer computational resources allocated to each signal from that area (Erickson and St. James 1986).  As a result, there is a trade-off between the size of the spotlight of attention and the response times to (and the resolution of) the objects illuminated by attention (Erickson and St. James 1986; Erickson and Yeh 1985).  In short, it appears that visual attention actually behaves more like the zoom lens of a camera than like a spotlight.
So here’s what we’ve got so far: The visual system is constrained in multiple ways in its ability to form high-level, high-detail representations of the surrounding environment.  It compensates for these limitations by rapidly shifting the fovea and shifting/narrowing attention from region to region of (or possibly from object to object in) the environment.  How does the visual system guide this flurry of activity in the course of a visual search?  To answer this question, we first need to distinguish between two general kinds of visual search: Pop-out search and conjunctive search.  Visual psychologists have written much about the phenomenon of “pop out”—i.e. when a single item seems to pop out from a field of other items.  The predominate explanation of pop out is that it occurs when one object differs from the objects surrounding it in virtue of exhibiting a feature that 1) none of the surrounding objects exhibit and 2) can be registered by the massively parallel processing of pre-attentive vision alone. In this way, the phenomenon of pop out can be used as a test to determine which features are registered in pre-attentive vision (Treisman and Gelade 1980).​[12]​ 
Most real-world visual searches do not involve pop out.  In most real-world searches, the sought-after object typically differs from the objects surrounding it in virtue of a combination of pre-attentive features and hence cannot be isolated from those objects using the massively parallel processing of pre-attentive vision alone.  Visual psychologists refer to such searches as “conjunctive searches”.  These searches require the use of visual attention, and, as a result, involve managing the limited resources of both the fovea and attention. These are the searches (conjunctive searches) that I wish to investigate.
So, back to our question: How does the visual system use the limited resources of the fovea and attention to search the surrounding environment for an object in a conjunctive search? One possibility would be to shift the fovea and a narrow, high-detail setting of attention inch by inch over the entire scene before the eyes until either the object is found or the entire space has been scanned.  Although a poorly designed computer might search the environment in this manner, this is not how the human visual system typically conducts its searches. Instead, our visual system uses various shortcuts and strategies that allow it to spend more time investigating those regions where the sought-after object is likely to reside while ignoring those regions where it is not likely to reside. For example, one important purpose played by the multitude of lower-detail and/or lower-level visual representations that we have at any given moment is to provide low-cost previews of regions of the surrounding space which can help guide the deployment of our more limited higher-level, higher-detail visual resources in searching that space.  Pre-attentive representations, for example, give the visual system a preview of various regions that help to determine whether it will investigate those regions more closely using attention.  Similarly, peripheral representations provide a preview for the fovea and lower-detail settings of attention provide a preview for higher-detail settings of attention.  
It’s widely thought by visual psychologists that the activity of using low-level/low-detail representations to guide the deployment of more limited, high-level/high-detail representational capacities (i.e. fixation and attention) is subject to both bottom-up, stimulus-driven control as well as top-down, user-driven control.  Consider, as an example, the influential model of visual search developed by Jeremy Wolfe (1994). According to Wolfe, the early stages of visual processing involve various “feature maps”—i.e. pre-attentive representations of the low-level visual features of the scene before the eyes. The level of activation of a given region of a feature map is determined by both bottom-up and top-down influences: Bottom-up contributions are determined by how unique an item is relative to its immediate surroundings—the more unique it is, the higher its level of activation. Top-down contributions, in contrast, are determined by the task the subject takes herself to be performing.​[13]​  For instance, if she takes herself to be looking for a red “X”, top-down processing might amplify the activation provided by bottom-up processing in favor of red things and orientations that would be indicative of the “X” shape while decreasing the activation of other low-level pre-attentive visual features.  After the activation levels of various regions of these features maps are fixed by bottom-up and top-down processes, the visual system shifts attention to the region with the highest activation level and then work its way down until the regions it is exploring fail to reach a certain minimum threshold of activation.  (Once a region is explored, its activation is reduced so that it will not be explored by attention again.)
A similar model is presented in Torralba et al. 2006.  Torralba et al. argue that in addition to the feature maps discussed by Wolfe, visual attention is also guided by a pre-attentive representation of the global features of a scene (i.e. a pre-attentive representation of the overall spatial organization of a scene) and that top-down, user-driven influences can play a role in determining which aspects of this global features representation will capture visual attention during the subsequent search.  For our purposes, what’s important about both Wolfe’s model and the model of Torralba et al. is the prominent role that top-down, user-driven influences play in determining the activation levels of regions of feature maps and of regions of pre-attentive representations of the spatial organization of a scene.  These theorists are not alone in positing a prominent role for top-down, user-driven elements in visual search; similar appeals are widespread in the literature on visual attention. 
Now let’s turn to the question of how we can take advantage of this top-down, user-driven influence to exert control over our everyday visual searches. To start with, we can exert control by explicitly setting the parameters of a search.  I can consciously decide to try to find my keys in virtue of looking in a particular location (e.g. the end of the table), in virtue of looking for a particular feature of the keys (e.g. their color), in virtue of looking for a particular global feature of the scene (e.g. horizontal surfaces), or some combination thereof.​[14]​  (We can think of these explicit decisions as exerting top-down influence on the activation levels of regions of the feature maps discussed by Wolfe and/or regions of the global features representation discussed by Torralba et al.)  
In virtue of the limitations of the visual system, decisions about where you will conduct your search are not as trivial and insignificant as they may seem to be.  Given that we cannot foveally represent a space much bigger than the size of a thumbnail at arm’s length, decisions about where you will search for your keys can be (and perhaps should be) far more fine-grained than simply deciding to look at the table.  Decisions about how to search are also not trivial.  Ongoing empirical research can give us a better idea of exactly which local and global features of the scene are pre-attentively represented by our visual systems.  This, in turn, could give us a better idea of what the basic options are in terms of directing our fixation/attention during visual search.  Some ways of deciding how to look for your keys (in virtue of their color, their size, on flat surfaces, etc.) are likely to better play to the strengths of the visual system (and pre-attentive processing) than other ways. 
One can also exert control over what Wolfe calls the “sampling strategy”—the manner in which the fovea and visual attention scans/samples the surrounding scene.  Automatic (or unreflective) deployment of fixation and visual attention during a search appears considerably more jumpy (items are not scanned in order, some items are scanned multiple times, etc.) than volitional deployment where the subject tries to scan the scene in a more methodical manner (say, for instance, by trying to scan systematically from left to right). There are important empirical questions about the costs and benefits of each kind of sampling strategy.  (Wolfe et al. (2000), for example, argue that volitional deployments are considerably slower than automatic deployments.)  Once these questions are answered, subjects could use this information in deciding how much of a hand they should take in actively shaping the sampling strategy of a given search.
Earlier I mentioned that visual attention acts more like a zoom lens than a spotlight—as attention is expanded to take in a larger area, there are fewer computational resources allocated to each signal from the area. If we have some control over the zoom lens of attention, then there will be important cost/benefit questions to consider when setting the size of it during a visual search, questions that could be answered by the cognitive sciences.   This, in turn, is another way in which results from the cognitive sciences could aid us in making informed decisions about how to conduct our searches.
Once the parameters of a search are defined—once you’ve decided where you will look, what features you will look for, whether the sampling strategy will be automatic or volitional, how wide or narrow attention will be, etc.—the next aspect of the visual search that you are capable of exerting control over involves regulating the actual flow and ebb of the search.  Fixation and attention shift quickly—fixation can shift in as little time as 5 to 80 ms (Grimes 1996) and a covert shift of attention (a shift of attention that occurs without a shift of fixation) can occur in as quickly as 30 to 50 ms (Saarinen and Julesz 1991).  It would be ridiculous to claim that we can control every individual shift of fixation or attention. Rather, our control over this process is more regulatory in nature.  As Kent Bach (a philosopher) has expressed the basic idea— 

In the case of attention, control is not a matter of determining its focus at every moment…Exercising control over your attention just means regulating it so that, for example, whenever you are involved in an activity and irrelevant thoughts occur (memories, desires, fantasies), you are able to restore your attention to what you are doing.  (1994, 57)

In this passage, Bach is discussing attention more generally and not the specific kind of attention that we are interested in—namely, visual attention.  But what Bach says about attention more generally also extends to the cases of visual attention and visual fixation.  When conducting a visual search of the environment, we do not control every shift of attention and fixation; rather, we decide to look for a certain object (and perhaps make some initial decisions about where and how we will look for it) and then intercede in the subsequent search if the process gets off track. 
	Pashler and Remuzzi have determined that if a subject forms a mental image of something irrelevant immediately before conducting her search, the ensuing search ends up being slower than it otherwise would be.​[15]​  On the basis of this result, Pashler hypothesizes that when we imagine something immediately prior to our search, our visual systems adopt strategies to search for that thing even if it isn’t the official target of the search. He then extends this hypothesis to include the possibility that “any mental manipulation of conceptual (not merely visual) representation primes the system to search for instances of the concept” (250).  If Pashler’s hypothesis is correct, it follows that one important way in which we could (and should) intercede in our searches is when we find ourselves visualizing (or otherwise thinking about) an item other than the one we are looking for.
	Another important way that we can intercede in an ongoing search is by adjusting where and/or how we are looking for the object in question. Suppose that my search for a book with a green cover is going poorly.  I can change how I am looking for that book.  Instead of looking for its green cover, I can decide to look for it in virtue of its unusually small size, or in virtue of the orientation of the design on its binding, or in virtue of its width.  I can decide to focus on some other aspect of my pre-attentive representation of the overall structural organization of the scene. I can modify my sampling strategy.  I can also modify where I am looking for the book: I can expand my search area (and maybe the zoom lens of attention) to include the entire bookshelf or decrease it to include only the left end of the second shelf.  
(It easy to underestimate how important it can be to modify where (or how) we are looking for an object.  I can illustrate this point with an example from my own life: There are cooking utensils hanging in rows on a wall in my kitchen.  I hang the spatula on the bottom row, on the right; my partner hangs it on the second row from the bottom, on the right.  I have often earnestly searched the bottom row, right end of the utensil rack for the spatula in vain, eventually had to ask my partner for help, and then suffered the embarrassing experience of learning that it was right in front of my face, just inches from where I was looking.)
We have the ability to intercede in a search and to change both where and how we are searching at any point during the search.  As a result, there could be ways of improving a visual search not only with respect to how we should intercede or otherwise regulate its ongoing activity, but also with respect to when we should intercede.  Indeed, it’s not hard to think that what distinguishes the search of an expert detective at a crime scene from that of the novice has to do with not only what they look for (and where and how they look for it), but also when they modify the parameters of their searches.  
	Some searches are unsuccessful; sometimes we fail to find what we are looking for.  We are free to extend or cut short a failing search in a variety of ways.  Returning to Wolfe’s model, one form that this kind of control could take is in terms of lowering the minimum activation threshold necessary to attract attention (this would result in attention exploring more items that it would have otherwise); another form it could take is in virtue of resetting the activation level of previously explored objects (this would result in attention revisiting objects that it had already investigated).  Further empirical investigation of these potential forms of control over search termination could yield further insights into improving the thoroughness of our searches which, in turn, would have important consequences for the epistemic quality of the conclusions we draw on the basis of a failed search.  (I’ll return to this point in the conclusion.)
	The previous discussion gives us a sense of just some of the possibilities with respect to exerting interesting and fine-grained control over our general, everyday searches. In closing this section, I’d like to tentatively apply some of these possibilities for control to the case of Jimmy’s failed search.  What could Jimmy have done differently in an effort to improve his search?  First off, he could have set the parameters of his search differently.  (To be clear, it’s possible that Jimmy made no decisions about where and how to search for his socks; it’s possible that he just started looking.  For expositional purposes, however, I will speak as though Jimmy made a conscious decision about this and other things related to his search.)  Given the extreme limitations of the visual system, Jimmy’s decisions about where to look can be (and perhaps should be) far more fine-grained than simply deciding to look at the floor.  He also could have made different decisions about how to look for his socks; as we saw earlier, some ways of deciding how to look for his socks will better play to the strengths of Jimmy’s visual system than other ways of looking for them. In addition, he could have made a different decision about his sampling strategy—i.e. whether he should allow his fovea/visual attention to scan this environment in a relatively automatic fashion or whether he should force this scanning to be more systematic.  He could have made a different decision about the setting of the zoom lens of visual attention during his search. He could have made a different decision about how (and when) to intercede in his search.  He could have made more of an effort to keep his thoughts focused on his socks during the search (as opposed to imagining the baseball game he was about to play in); indeed, in an effort to prime his visual system he could have formed a visual image of his socks immediately prior to searching.  And given that his search was unsuccessful, he could have made different decisions about the termination of his search, decisions that, in turn, could have improved the thoroughness of that search.  
So it appears that Jimmy had lots of options for controlling his search.  To be clear, Jimmy and the rest of us must wait for the cognitive sciences to provide the details necessary to make informed choices with respect to these decisions about how to conduct our searches.  The important point for today is that we have the kind of control over our searches that is required to implement such decisions, even if we currently lack the information necessary for making these decisions in an informed manner.

5. Conclusion: Aiming our Search Beliefs Towards Broadly Epistemic Goals
In the previous section, I pointed to various ways of exerting fine-grained control over our visual searches.  I suspect that most will feel that it’s obvious that these forms of control over our searches can be used to help guide the resultant beliefs towards the goals of avoiding error, fighting ignorance, and believing expediently.  For sake of completeness, however, I want to close this paper by explicitly showing how the previously discussed forms of control can be used towards these ends.
It will help to introduce some terminology:  In conducting a visual search, we gather evidence—i.e. we acquire visual experiences—with the aim of bringing about some effect or other from within a certain range of desired doxastic effects.  If, for example, I am looking on the table for my keys, I am gathering evidence in an attempt to arrive (via my visual experiences) either at the belief that the keys are present or at the belief that they are not.​[16]​ For expositional purposes, I will call the range of doxastic effects that the subject is aiming at with a given search her “search beliefs”.​[17]​ 
Imagine you are looking for a particular object—e.g. your keys on the table.  In the case of a successful search, the search belief that the sought-after object is present will be caused by a visual experience of that object—your belief that your keys are on the table will be caused by a visual experience of them.​[18]​ In cases where your search is unsuccessful, however, the connection between visual experience and search belief ends up being more complicated.  In a failed search for your keys, the resultant search belief that the keys are absent is not the result of any single experience from the search; rather, it is the result of a series of experiences, none of which speak in favor of the keys being present. And to be clear, there are really two possible doxastic outcomes of this failed search: 1) the belief that the keys are absent from the visible scene, or 2) “nonbelief” (i.e. agnosticism) about the presence/absence of the keys.​[19]​  I think that we have little direct control over whether our doxastic response to a failed search is one of disbelief or of nonbelief; in the case of a failed search, it seems to me that we are not free to decide between believing that the keys are absent and having no belief about their presence/absence.  Instead, we simply find ourselves doing one or the other. 
Now that I’ve explained the idea of “search beliefs” and said a little about the connection between a search (be it successful or unsuccessful) and the ensuing beliefs (or nonbelief), let’s get back to the topic at hand—the ability to aim search beliefs towards various broadly epistemic goals by controlling the preceding search.  Consider a case where you are searching for a particular object.  In this case, you can make yourself search in a way such that, if the object is present in the visible space before your eyes, searching in this way increases the likelihood of finding it.  (Of course, the specifics of how you should do this will depend on what you are looking for, the environment you are searching, other contextual factors, etc.)  And this, in turn, makes it more likely that you will end up with the true belief that the object is present, which, depending on what the alternative doxastic outcome to your search would have been, will be a way of combating either error or ignorance: In the case where your search, if it had failed, would have resulted in the false belief that the object is absent, the above is a way of fighting error.  In the case where your search, if it had failed, would have resulted in mere nonbelief, the above is a way of fighting ignorance.  
Let’s turn our attention to a case where the sought-after object is not before your eyes.  In this case, making yourself search in a way such that, if the object were in the visible space before your eyes, searching in this way would increase the likelihood of finding it makes it more likely that your failed search is truly indicative of the object’s absence.  To put it crudely, a failed search that is thorough is a more reliable indicator that the sought-after object is not present than is a failed search that consisted of little more than a glance.  This, in turn, means that if the result of your failed search is the belief that the object is absent, then controlling your search in the above manner makes it more likely that this belief will be true.  (A complication arises: Earlier I claimed that we cannot directly control whether the doxastic outcome of a failed search is the belief that the object is absent or is mere nonbelief.  Hence, controlling a failed search in the above manner does not guarantee that you will arrive at the belief that the object is absent, but it does support the claim that if you arrive at this belief, your belief will be more likely to be true.)
So far I’ve focused on the goals of avoiding error and fighting ignorance.  Now let’s turn to the goal of forming belief quickly.  Sometimes we need to the settle the question of whether a sought-after object is before our eyes within a certain time frame.  In situations where there is a time constraint on a search, we can make ourselves search in a way such that, if the object is in the visible space before our eyes, searching this way increases the likelihood of finding it within the required time frame.  For example, we can set up the parameters of the search in such a way that we will not try to examine all the areas that we believe to be relevant; we can modify how or where we are searching more quickly than we would have otherwise; we can make fewer modification during our search than we would have otherwise; we can choose the appropriate sampling strategy (according to Wolfe et al. 2000, an automatic sampling strategy is faster than a volitional sampling strategy); and so on.  These, in turn, could all be ways of aiming the ensuing beliefs towards the broadly epistemic goal of speed.  
	In this final section, I’ve sketched some of the general ways that we can use our control of a visual search to aim the resultant search beliefs towards broadly epistemic goals.  This discussion has been both abstract and truncated; I’m sure there are additional (more detailed) ways in which one can use a visual search to aim the resultant search beliefs towards the goals of avoiding error, combating ignorance, and/or forming beliefs quickly. But the previous discussion is detailed enough to support the claim that there are lots of interesting ways to use our visual search to positively influence the resultant visual beliefs towards various broadly epistemic goals.  In short, it is detailed enough to establish that we can have interesting responsibilities when gathering evidence during our visual searches.​[20]​
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^1	 Notes Not everyone would agree with this claim; see, for example, Feldman 2001.
^2	  The following discussion of the distinction between direct and indirect control over belief owes much to Alston (1988, 2005). 
^3	  We can further distinguish between the various kinds of direct control in terms of their immediacy.  Perhaps we have a kind of direct control over belief where we can immediately execute an intention to take up a specific, predetermined belief.  Or perhaps we have a kind of direct control over belief where it takes an extended period of time to carry out such an intention.  For a detailed discussion of the various options with respect to how immediate direct control over belief might be, see Alston 1988, 2005.
^4	  Alston (1988, 2005) refers to this form of control over belief as “indirect voluntary influence”.
^5	  For just some of the recent arguments on both sides of this debate, see the papers in Steup 2001.
^6	  Our ability to indirectly control visual beliefs via our visual searches may also result in our having various long-term responsibilities with respect to those beliefs.  We could, for instance, have long-term responsibilities to try to change our search habits in a way that would help to aim the resultant visual beliefs towards various epistemic goals.  For expositional purposes, however, I am ignoring these long-term responsibilities and focusing only on short-term responsibilities.
^7	  These three goals are versions of three forms of epistemic evaluation—reliability, power, and speed—discussed in detail in Goldman 1986.
^8	  Aiming our beliefs towards truth and away from falsity is a relatively uncontroversial example of an epistemic goal.  (But see Stich 1990.)  Some may flinch, however, at describing the goals of gathering evidence (and forming the relevant visual beliefs) quickly and of doing so with the aim of avoiding ignorance as also being epistemic in nature, especially in cases where either of these latter goals conflicts with the former. It is for conciliatory purposes, then, that I refer to all three of these evidence-gathering responsibilities as being “broadly epistemic”.
^9	  For a similar distinction between “subjective” and “objective” responsibilities, see Alson 1988, 88.  
^10	  I want to note that Noë himself does not subscribe to the “snapshot” conception of visual experience.
^11	  For nice reviews of some of these issues, see Pashler 1998 and Palmer 1999.
^12	  Color and orientation, for example, appear to be low-level visual features that are registered in this manner.  As I mentioned earlier, however, there is disagreement over just how high-level the features registered by pre-attentive vision can be.  Some recent studies have suggested that pop out can occur even when the relevant difference between target and distractors involves higher-level features, including some three-dimensional features. (For a review of some of this literature, see Pashler 1998.) 
^13	  Top-down activation of these features maps is not especially fine-grained; for example, subjects can activate regions of an orientation feature map with “steep” orientations, but they cannot activate all and only regions with 20-degree orientations.
^14	  This is not to imply that every time a visual search is initiated the subject makes a conscious decision about where and how they will look for the item that they are seeking.  Indeed, I suspect that most cases of initiating a visual search do not involve such a decision.  But this should not detract from the fact that we could have made a decision, if we had chosen to do so. 
^15	  The experiment behind this result is discussed in Pashler 1998, 249-250.
^16	  I am assuming that nonbelief is not one of the possible doxastic outcomes that a subject aims at when conducting a search.  Perhaps this assumption can be challenged; I will not, however, investigate it any further here.
^17	  If the aim of a visual search is broad enough, then almost any visual belief formed via that search will satisfy my definition of being a “search belief”.  If, for example, I conduct a search for the purpose of acquiring as many true beliefs as I can about the surrounding environment, then all the resultant visual beliefs will count as being search beliefs.
^18	  It is possible for you to visually discriminate your keys while not coming to believe that they are before your eyes.  For instance, you might mistake them for something else, you might not have the concept keys, you might have the concept keys but not know how to apply it to objects via your visual experiences, or you might be convinced that you are hallucinating.  So what I should really say is that given certain ceteris paribus conditions, your search belief that the sought-after object is present will be caused by a visual experience of that object. For more on these ceteris paribus conditions, see Dretske 1999.
^19	  The outcome of a failed search can also be a combination of the above—the belief that the object is not in a particular region before your eyes combined with nonbelief about its presence in/absence from other, less explored regions.
^20	  An early version of some of these ideas was presented at Arkansas State University on June 28, 2004.  I am thankful for the comments I received during that talk.  I also want to thank Chuck Carr, Eric Cave, Mike Cundall, Dave Hilbert, Marya Schechtman, and an anonymous referee from The Southern Journal of Philosophy for their comments on various drafts of this paper. 
